O excerto em questão é uma parte do artigo sendo construído sobre ética argumentativa para publicação lá fora. Em virtude disso, uma parte importante da apresentação ficou de fora. Você pode conferir a parte anterior lendo aqui.
You can read the previous part where i present hoppe’s argument by clicking in this text.
GOOD IS NOT PERFECT
The presentation of Professor Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics in full terms, contextualized as a pragmatic point of view of the ethics discussion combined with libertarian affirmatives is a better structure than most of the earlier tries but has at least three big problems.
The first big problem is called The Ontological Problem, and it is better described as follows: there are no substantial reasons for us to believe that the ontological structure of humans is uniform and if it is not uniform there are no substantial reasons for us to believe in a performative contradiction in denying argumentation ethics’s main premises.
The second big problem is called the apocalypse trolley problem and it follows like this: if someone stresses the argumentation ethics by putting it to solve a dilemma where the option to not kill would kill all humanity as a consequence, then it is unable to give a clear answer to the dilemma.
The last but not less important problem is the ontological commitments problem. There are many commitments to Professor Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics that were not considered, and some of them are contradictory in themselves.
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM
The first thing we need to understand is that Professor Hoppe rejects ontological naturalism. He believes that it is not possible to the natural science to understand human existence in its purposes, the conjunct of abstractions that surpass the physical element. So, we cannot try to explain the ontological problem in naturalistic terms.
What Professor Hoppe is trying to give us is the notion that when we are arguing, we have a precise and uniform purpose: reach a mutual basis on the normative matters being discussed and that this purpose comes with the commitment of the opponent heteronomy. As the subject that is being discussed is precisely the rights of someone, denying a more straightforward statement would be contradictory.
The third thing is that it is true that if this were the universal purpose of any normative argumentation, we would need to attend Professor Hoppe’s conclusions. The main problem is that we do not have any substantial reasons to believe that this is the case.
First, let us understand what a purpose is. We can say that a purpose is a psychological mind state that we want to accomplish based on a physical state of things. It is not a physical state only precisely because of Professor Hoppe’s arguments against naturalistic explanations of purpose. So, when someone says that we have a mutual mind state when we are involved in argumentation, he is saying that we cannot have a different mind state based on the same action. He is attaching the mind state and the action inseparably.
Now, can we say that humans have a unique universal purpose when they do some action? Well, if we can identify the real reasons why someone does something, and not a general statement that gives us the comprehension that he values this action the most, we could state a sequential regression from all the actions and understand the human function in its more profound questions.
However, this seems a little bit closer to mad-scientist stuff than real comprehension of the object. Even if someone says that it appears to be that way, he is not justified in saying it. Let us give a hypothetic example:
Imagine Mr. Marlboro, Mr. Marlboro is a famous thief, and he is about to do a great robbery into Mr. Zap’s House. Mr. Marlboro got surprised when Mr. Zap pulled a gun out of his jacket; they put the guns down and started a dialogue.
In Mr. Zap’s mind, they are discussing the peaceful possibilities that could result from the discussion, and if he starts to shoot, he will fall in a performative contradiction with his attempt of dialogue, the active ontological consideration he made.
In Mr. Marlboro’s mind, he is saving time to his partner Mr. Master Jaga to surprise Mr. Zap and kill him. His purpose is not to solve the normative problem that appeared from his actions, but to waste Mr. Zap’s time. Any other action, like an improvised trumpet presentation, would serve his actual purpose. He did not make the ontological consideration while arguing and, therefore, he is not falling into contradiction when his next actions deny it.
Notice that we are not saying that this could not be the pragmatic consideration in multiple cases, we can effectively make that consideration, but we are not justified in saying that this is a universal consideration. This is the structural ontological problem.
One possible objection to this problem is that: if the coordination purpose defines argumentation, then if someone has another purpose to the physical action of argumentation, it is not precisely argumentation but another very similar thing. The problem that emerges from that objection is that it makes it very tough to state that every human being has had a real argumentation in his life or will come to have by the age that he manages to get a real moral consciousness. This happens because the speech acts turn out to possibly become strategic actions, using instrumental reasoning and not communicative actions using communicative reasoning.
A second objection is that someone could reply to this saying that moral consciousness is only possible after this kind of ontological consideration, but there are no background reasons in our modern’s moral theories for us to believe in this.
A way left out of this problem could be that we have two main reasons to believe that there is a universal ontological coordination that pushes us to the normative parameters claimed by Professor Hoppe: the existence of moral facts and the appearance that this kind of construction has an specific purpose. But, for this to be defendable, we will need a foundationist fundament for instance Michael Huemer’s Ethical Intuitionism and to use the Argumentation Ethics as a meta-ethics tool and not as the basis of property rights derivation.
THE TROLLEY PROBLEM
In a post-apocalyptic scenario, a runaway trolley is about to kill the last five living women. A distant male observer realizes this and comes across a button. By pushing this button, the train will be moved to the top platform killing his son. No person caused this directly. What is the correct posture to take if it is taken into consideration that killing that five women will result at the end of mankind, and he will be the cause of his son’s death if he pushes the button?
The scenario can be changed into the opposite. His son is about to die, and to push the button would cause the women’s death. What is the correct position to take? This is not clear. Unify this with Professor Hoppe’s statement that any solid ethics should be able to preserve mankind, and we got a significant problem:
“And since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative must be rejected.”
Professor Hoppe’s argumentation ethics is terrible in dealing with any life and death dilemmas, like, for example, if the last man and woman in the earth were in a situation where the man does not want sex, and the reason why the woman tries to dialogue is ultimately the human consideration that she has with his kind, would her fall in a contradiction when using force if the purpose of forcing him to do sex is the same that she took when trying to convince him by engaging in an argumentation? This is the post-apocalypse trolley problem applied to Professor Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics.
An attentive objector may say that there is not causality between the way that certain ethic deals with dilemmas and the validity of the ethic itself. This objection is a little bit tricky because it tries to make the problem look exclusively within the dilemma scope and not in the ethics itself.
What needs to be clarified is that the dilemma is just a hyperbolic way of showing a contradiction form. The problem runs around hermeneutics behind an almost active duty of any father within his son against his moral obligation in not performing aggressions and not ending the mankind as the results of his actions and is only showed by the dilemma and not explained by it.
THE ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS PROBLEM
This is perhaps the leading critic and appeared from the fact that we can figure that when Professor Hoppe’s argumentation ethics is purposed, it is mainly about a materialistic expression of any ethics that must be accomplished when someone presents any new proposal on the claim desk. However, it is not that simple when it comes to metaethics itself. Think about it: Excluding wills are the purpose upon which ethics are about and are not always about materialistic expressions, and it would be a big mistake from us to consider it this way.
Think about the family relationship between a son and a mom. Does it make sense to be stated in terms of self-ownership? It appears to us that even if a son can be abandoned with fourteen years old (or even older), the age where he already has the moral consciousness needed to consent and therefore show a full self-ownership, it appears not to be a right thing to do.
The reason for this is that we do not think only in terms of consent but life planning terms too, and we know that a teenager is not able to take his own life by himself in this age on most cases. This is being stated for us to understand that it is not because we need to fulfill the materialistic element of ethics puzzle that we must reduce the problem in these terms.
Some people would use the argument that what is being stablished are things that could be enforced-by-law and that we should only enforce the elements that correspond to that materialistic expression. Ok, we can see some good intentions behind that statement, but almost no good reason for this; as a matter of fact, this must be further explained from anyone that wants to defend this kind of view.
Some people could even think that when we are corresponding to negative rights, we are jailed into this materialistic view. Nevertheless, it is not true at all. Looking into Van Dun’s liberty hermeneutics consideration putting liberty as the political-philosophical end that must be accomplished by libertarians, whatsoever he is correct in his specific battle against the conflict which motivated his views; he taught us that we could view the whole problem in different ways and still keeping the libertarian core beliefs operating by following Rothbard’s same measure on The Libertarian Manifesto.
It is not that we reject ethics property-based for libertarian purposes; it is just that there are no good reasons to believe that the discussion must be entangled to these terms.
A priori, the second commitment is not as big as the first one, but it is a harder one to solve. Professor Hoppe’s ontological argument uses language games, as stated by Wittgenstein, to explain the process of a child to comprehend any action by the regular adjustment of it in its socialization process. Nevertheless, if the purposes of the actions are explained in terms of socialization, and we do not have a universal method of socialization, how can we say that the purposes of the actions are universal in themselves? We cannot say it.
Someone can reply it saying that there are objective elements in any socialization process, i.e. our own access to the public language. The problem is that this opens the gate for other problems, like: How similar this process needs to be for us to effectively have a universal purpose paradigm? And if we do have an objective socialization structure that makes us to think on a universal proposal for our actions, how can we explain that aggression still exists as a real method for multiple agents? If the person passed through a process that attaches objectively normative solutions with argumentation and they opt not to argument, are they intrinsically evil?
BRINGING STEPHAN KINSELLA TO THE DISCUSSION
One possible reply is that these problems are just technical issues and that we must keep with the part of the society that wants to solve problems in a pacific way using arguments, most of the population to be honest. This argument says that you can’t deny the use of the force against you if you have already used it, so just get the ones that fail to argument and use the force against then in the pragmatic occurrence. The problem remains in the fact that if there is not any normative background, this structure becomes a Tu Quoque Fallacy. It is precisely the universalization instrument that brings the validity of arguments like Kinsella’s Estoppel pointing out an ontological consideration before a deontic one.
Other possible reply would be in the sense that even if Mr. Marlboro is not arguing truly, he would need to do it in order to effectively say that the last dialogue was not a true argument and when that happens someone could point that the position that he is taking now is contradictory with the last position he took and use the estoppel time appeal here. This could make a path to the point where the “realms of law” are what is argumentatively constituted, and this entrance is what really constitutes the performative contradiction. This would open lots of new points that need to be fulfilled. We are talking about something like this:
What are the characteristics of this realm? What are the limits that separate these two realms? What does the argumentation have intrinsically that makes the bridge? Can we speak in terms of is/ought problems for something like should/ought? This is a way out that needs a lot of explanations before it moves on and only helps Estoppel Approach’s and not Argumentation Ethics in itself.
Another consideration that must be made is that these problems are not forgetting that the contradiction at Hoppe’s Argument happens between the formal meaningful element of a set of propositions that were effectively spoken and some action. What we are saying is that the purpose is belief-based and that the real beliefs are not necessarily attached to a formal element, but instead are attached to a psychological state. And for the record, this psychological state is the minimal element of any justification because even when we consider that most justifications are made in discourse, we must consider a possible scenario where someone is justified to act in some way or to see something in a particular way and he is the only human in the world.
A possible reply to this is that; when we consider moral facts, they are only concerned to the existence of two persons mutual excluding wills and we must remember that they must solve in some way the rights problem in a political way. This kind of view turns the point to a political measure in ethics. The problem here is that actions are way more complex and antecede the political measurement. Let’s explain why.
The main formulations of any society go through 3 constitutive elements: the adoption of a plan of authority and loyalty where we can perceive a hierarchy among the subjects, the material division of society’s resources through time and space, and the coordination of efforts not mutually excluding through communicative mechanisms.
These are the three ways by which any complex society will necessarily pass through. The first is about fascination and the immediate understanding of the subjects as passive beings of reality. This subjection will, in any case, be a direct understanding of an immanent superiority of certain relations. Hence the perspective of the divine and an entire construction of vertical hierarchies. Society depends at some level on these hierarchies because they are fundamental bases on which, regardless of rational constructions, cooperation can be established. Furthermore, this is because the rationality needs to correspond to some perceptions about states of affairs. Moreover, for that understanding to take place, we need a subject who can measure something different from what it is. For that, this person needs certain constructs like name and personality. Without them, we cannot distance ourselves from these states of affairs. This first instance of reality, which occurs through fascination and the most straightforward relations of social organization, are ultimately the first to take place on the plane.
Nevertheless, society, in general, will be able to compose itself only through more advanced constructs, and that is where the other two elements come in. The second is the material division of resources. We will pass here directly through the following perspective; there is a course of history in which, through different relationships between subjects, what was materially valued has been allocated in a certain way. A person who is born in any environment will realize the existence of these conditions even before he can effectively build his personality, and indeed will have some interference from these material conditions in his personality. Hegel and Marx realized this reality. They realized that there was fundamentally a material condition that was independent of any formulation of the subject. Using this starting point, these men decided to analyze reality through it.
Hegel had a subject’s idea which we are in such a way in a society, that our internal views are visions of the society, which is built in this society-individual relationship without being individualized in a way that does not pass through this social reality. This kind of prison in Hegel awakens us to the perception that the subject is conditioned to his civil status. Society becomes the instrument for understanding the subject and, at the same time, the instrument by which the subject understands society. This mutual and reciprocal relationship will then give the subject the following outline: when perceiving the condition of being social, even his attempt to move away from this condition is a social act.
Marx will come and say more than that. Marx will say that our conditions for changing reality are necessarily material forms of change. Thus, work, for example, is an ontological condition conditioned by a material condition. Labor is about things that are beyond our hands — historical, social, and economic conditions. The countryman works in a certain way because he was not born a nobleman. The military man does not pray because he was not born into a religious family. Whatever is someone denomination, or how someone performs in the world in terms of labor, it will be conditioned somehow by a previous condition of which this person has said nothing. This perception will lead us to ideas like alienation, exploitation, and fetishism. However, there is a way out of everything. While these material conditions exist, they are and must be the fruit of elements of reality. To do this, we need to keep in mind that those factors that caused them will also be factors that can modify them. This perception will cause us to leave Hegel and Marx’s cage.
The social mobility is inherent in the material condition because it is what led to starting this condition. Thus, society is organized materially, but only because we have laws that describe reality, such as the factual laws that will fundamentally create these material conditions. However, how does this relationship of social mobility take place? This is where we enter the discursive aspect of reality. So far, we have addressed two crucial aspects of reality: verticality and history. Now we need to understand what is the way that the subject interferes in these relations and in which we begin to deal with rationality itself. Well, the first thing to understand is that a natural condition of existence is the necessity. We have needs that will first describe our first desires.
We need to feed ourselves, oxygen, and other essential conditions for survival. To maintain these minimum conditions of survival, we will look for resources that can do so. This relationship of resources and people are, before any social perspective since it exists even before the family relationship, what comes precisely to supply it. These first-rate needs are elementary compared to the kind of needs we speak of in a complex society. How did we get here?
Well, the prospect that at some point, relationships of fascination over time created conditions where we could accumulate resources for more than our immediate needs, seems to be the fairest answer. The existence of overcoming the state of need of the first order to give later needs is something easily found in our own human experience. Mortal hunger or absolute thirst are so overwhelming in our perspective that we fail to conceive of even the existence of others. This organic failure fundamentally is what gives us strong indications of this condition of need.
Maslow realized this conditional and created what became known as Maslow’s pyramid. If all the elements of the pyramid correspond to the order in which the needs occur, it is a later exercise of analysis that does not belong to us here. What we want to realize is the need to overcome the first stages because we do not even reach higher stages without it and that there is no denying that in our physiology, the biological state is the first element in any analysis of the individual.
That said, how will this measurement give us the way society is organized for social mobility? Well, the answer lies in the fact that we analyze reality through the interaction of subjects with our needs. Yes. Here it is suggested that our objective measurements go through the possibilities with which the medium will supply our needs. Here, we begin to measure the concept of Will.
We can qualify these possibilities as to how the subject interacts with reality. Willingness would fundamentally be our ability to face a set of given needs and a set of possibilities to meet those needs external to the individual; we express ourselves in order to meet them. Thus, Will is firstly Biological Will. This Biological Will is not only inherent in all subjects, but it is also a vivid element of understanding reality. We are not yet talking here about rationality, but about the elements necessary for it to happen.
The next element that will be needed will be causality. We need to understand that our needs can be met through these possibilities. We need to establish a cause and effect relationship. We need to understand ourselves as subjects who operate through the means to satisfy their needs, precisely the praxeological approach.
From the moment we realize that there is a correlation between the subject’s action and the achievement of the satisfaction of this need, we begin to see ourselves as agents in the world. This type of perception is what gives rise to strategic rationality, which determines the subject’s action in reality to achieve his ends. Well, this perception only explains a part of reality, the subject-object relationship.
Still, we have among us that subjects directly interfere in the way we think about the world. So how does this happen? When comparing elements of reality, we realize that certain elements have what can be called an activity. They can actively make changes. They are what we call living beings. Living beings are complex because they do not have a causal relationship as explicit as we usually see in objects, and this is because they can control their ends that are independent of any other subject. This is intuitive.
As soon as we start to interact with objects and living beings, we see that the latter does not depend on our conscious will to act. Thus, a child can perceive an essential difference between objects and living beings and modify their action due to this difference. It is imperative to be able to measure this in our experience. This difference between subjects and objects is not something that is taught, and nevertheless is something that fundamentally differentiates us. This awareness of this life-non-life duality is critical in the subject’s composition.
He goes on to state that even if he had infinite possibilities of interaction with the environment, he would still deny the possibilities that concern the internal control of living beings external to him. For anyone who doubts, just reflect on their own life. When someone wants another person to do something, is controlling the other person in their place, even a remote possibility?
The fact that this possibility is excluded for our natural resources (here differentiating the possibility that it may happen artificially someday) will give us an interesting perspective on human action. We need to interact with beings that interact back. Well, we were born. For us to be born, we come from an earlier form of life. This means that: in order to understand our relationship between subjects, we will first speak about the subject’s relationship with his past.
It is reasonable to establish that every individual is born in a community that precedes him. We are someone’s children. Our existence is then conceived as an act by a specific subject in that community. In this sense, we come to existence as a result of an act of cooperation between two subjects. The state of cooperation is essentially the state of coordinating non-exclusive wills of two subjects. This relationship between desires is one of the essential factors of our society. This is because, for all interactions between subjects, there is a will for each pole of this relationship. These wills can be mutually exclusive or non-exclusive.
We were able to conceive that for our existence to happen, cooperation was necessary, so it is easy to perceive cooperation as a primary element of social organization. For us to be discussing the subject, we had at least one example of peaceful interaction between two subjects. This relationship is only contingent and could have not been so. However, we can see that denying the existence of cooperation as a fact prior to reality is a contradiction with its existence.
An attentive observer could see that this is a pure fallacy. From which someone could come out, pointing out that for each interaction, there is a possibility that this interaction takes place through force. Moreover, in that sense, we claim that the previous fallacy was on purpose. The existence of a cooperative status different from that of violence is self-evident, but even as evident, it is hugely complex to perceive if not through a dialectical mechanism, where we place a possibility and see its opposite.
Thus, cooperation is the absence of force and force is the absence of cooperation. We can affirm in a slightly different way to what we situated before, saying that their existence is the dialectical proof that two subjects interacted and that, however, this interaction took place, we managed to realize that there is effectively an opposition to this status in the form of the cooperation-force binomial.
Now that we know that cooperation and force are necessary elements of reality, necessary predicates of action, we can then understand that the interaction of any subject will pass through the sieve of this binomial.
COOPERATION AND VICTORY OVER FORCE
Now, we return to the process of fascination. For there to be any notion of social organization, we need a relationship between subjects that is as primary as possible. It can be reflected now whether this fascination is a cooperative act or if it is an act of force. For this fascination to be a primary element, it must first be a perennial element in time.
Moreover, that will exclude any possibility of force being the element of the composition of this fascination. The reason for this is that any relationship between two subjects that are based on force is fundamentally one that is subject to the superior status of one of the subjects. Thus, it is enough that this status is not given for the fascination to be extinguished.
We must conceive, then, that there is, for example, the permanent voluntary status of the baby towards the mother caused by this status of fascination and that it will occur in several other ways throughout the history of societies. The existence of this superiority status that calls for the non-use of force initiates the status of social cooperation that will be fundamental for the existence of loyalty among the subjects.
However, the existence of this in the relationships where superiority is not evident as family relationships, a way is needed to express these subjects’ interactions. And that form will be the language, most notably the imperative language. This type of language designates orders, claims, and corresponds to an act of coordinating wills starting from a fascinator to the detriment of a fascinated one.
It is as if the fascinated’s obedience to imperative language corresponds to a self-imposed imposition related to the fascinator. Thus, we were able to conceive that the one who gave the first order that he saw attended, other than using force, started the process of social organization. Here, we start talking about a language formation process that will be extremely important for us to understand the ethical issue.
The imperative language is contained in all languages as we know them and is a language necessarily in time. In what way? The notion of order is the notion of an imposition that will take place in a time other than that next time. A wolf can ward off or give a lesser kind of imposition to another wolf by force, but it cannot require that a wolf go hunting at a time other than now or perform any other activity that does not correspond to the present.
Our ability to give orders that are greater than the present gives us the necessary continuous aspect that fascination has. Furthermore, they deliver us that we carry a perception about the time that contains the memory of the time of the next one; we know that when someone gives an order like, “Go in the fridge and get something for me,” we are referring to a sentence that will occur to me, that precedes my action itself, having stayed in the past, we will act in the present, and we will only end the action in the future. Thus, the notion of the three verb tenses is already necessarily contained in the obeying of any human order.
Here, using imperative language, we begin to interact over time. This interaction over time evolved until it reached a stage where we were able to perceive that between two different subjects, there could be a continuous bond that explains the fascination itself. The question is simple; from the moment when we are no longer in front of the fascinated, we can still perceive some existence and meaning of the subject. This will happen in human culture, mainly through valuing the dead.
We bury our dead as an act that demonstrates that even though not facing the person, it is still seen as a presence for which actions can be performed. This valuation of presence, even though it does not exist as a physical form, begins to give us the conception that we have the capacity for the abstraction of physical existence and even more, to actively perceive this state of fascination to which we were subjected. This active perception will be the fundamental what will give us a notion of the subject.
We perceive our existence, we perceive our position in society, and we realize that this status is contingent from the moment we internalize the possibility of death, here considered as the final status of fascination. From there, we begin to see a subject which reflects on the fascination that takes him and who, driven by his own needs, starts to try to exercise fascination, to understand the primary existence of something known as power.
The conception of power as the birth of a subject’s position where he can suppress the will of others will culminate in the existence of a significant number of exclusionary wills that will result in conflicts. So, we left the old conflict analysis as something that exists outside a rational analysis, primarily social, and started to see conflicts as a necessary social element, a fruit of the subject’s conception as an individual being in the face of the reality of the community that will end at some point in its existence.
However, the subject’s own ability to perceive that it is only a finite element of reality and its overcoming of the status of total submission to fascination will open the possibility for a status of something better than the status that exists. The perception that there is a death status also opens the door to the dialectical status of eternity. If things end, their immediate opposition is for them not to end. We were able to conceive eternity as a possibility.
The communicative reason appears here as a direct result of this perception of eternity. Combined with the strategic rationality of an exclusively individual nature, we began to conceive the rationality arising from the dual life-death that abstracts the conditions and values them. Because we can understand that our state of living is contingent, and are faced with the death of others, we can conceive that our existence is temporary.
The community starts to be perceived as independent from our existence. We are born in the community, but the community has a life of its own, and that will not concern the individual itself. This perception of the community as its own will last for a short time. Soon we are invited by reality to return to our perception. This is because several other individuals come to realize the same phenomenon and want to assert themselves in society as subjects.
Therefore, our relationship with the community becomes a relationship with individuals fundamentally. The tools by which this will happen will be fundamentally the superior functions of language, those that concern more than orders, but statements about objects, subjects, and mainly about our wills. Communication emerges here as a way of declaring the subjects’ wills.
From the moment that this communication becomes a real community fact, we can conceive conflicts’ resolution through these statements. It is about conceiving that from the moment I know what you want, and you know what I want, we can think of alternatives that are in between to meet these needs. While what we had within the fascination was a self-imposition of the will of others through language, here we have the possibility of having two individuals suppressing the total attendance of their will for consensus. How does this happen?
Think of the interaction as we saw it before. If before the existence of the neighbor was seen as something that limits our possibilities by not being able to control a neighbor’s internal control through our actions, here we can conceive a suppression of the will of the neighbor voluntarily without a latent superiority relationship. This will open the door to a horizontal society, where two similar subjects can achieve joint ends through peaceful interaction.
It is remembered here, then, of when the subject perceives the existence of an ideal state different from the real state. When the subject is faced with conflict resolution as a possibility of the community, he also starts to visualize an ideal conflict resolution. There is a state at least ideally where all conflicts are resolved through a specific set of intersubjective actions.
In this sense, we started the search for ethics. Ethics arise from the social organization itself; it arises from the fact that we know this cooperative relationship between the subjects, and we value it for its proximity to eternity. What we say here is that ethics arises from our ability to abstract, from the fact that we place the ideal as a potential status of any reality.
Thus, social mobility is the third element of society, as it concerns a horizontal structure of society and the one that will give rise to our ethical considerations. Ethics is necessary because we are human. Ethics is necessary because we can conceive it, and we can only conceive it because we are human. Ethics is then the state in which individual considerations will essentially become a consideration of the will of the community.
This notion breaks every Marxist and Hoppean possibility to condemn the action consideration to a pure political vision and makes us understand that it is precisely that transcendent element in the human understanding that makes all this possible, elements like intuitions are much closer to these considerations than argumentation ethics.